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ARTICLE
“SPIRITUAL PROPERTY, ‘INTELLECTUAL’
PROPERTY, AND A SOLUTION TO THE
MYSTERY OF IP RIGHTS IN
JEWISH LAW”
JEREMY STERN; JERUSALEM, ISRAEL
Anyone who studies Jewish law1 in the hopes of distilling a “Jewish”
theory of intellectual property will inevitably come to the conclusion that
this quest is no more than a fool’s errand. The sources that deal with the
topic are few and far between and most (if not all) of them turn out to be a
legal mirage: from a distance, these sources seem to present an understand-
ing of intellectual property, but when analyzed closely, they turn out to be
anything but expressions of a theory of intellectual property. Therefore, the
question that this paper will try to answer is why the traditional scholars of
Jewish law have been so hesitant to recognize and protect intellectual prop-
erty rights. The answer proposed here is that thought and knowledge belong
to the realm of the spirit and the divine. As such, thoughts cannot be owned
in the same sense that physical objects are possessed.
With the advent of the printing press, Jewish law developed mecha-
nisms to protect authors’ rights, yet these legal devices never developed
into a system of intellectual property rights per se and remained a collection
of ad hoc legal artifices lacking any kind of philosophy. The Western legal
traditions, by contrast, when faced with the same historical challenges, took
the necessary step toward a clear field of intellectual property.
Just to give a sense of the extent of the problem: most rabbis today
hold that Jewish law proper does not forbid using a pirated copy of Win-
dows, downloading music through mTorrent, or using pictures owned by
1. Jewish law encompasses the Old Testament, the Talmudic literature, including Babylo-
nian and Jerusalem Talmuds and their commentaries, the post-Talmudic codifications of Jewish
law, and the vast responsa literature. See generally 1 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY,
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes 1994) (outlining the history and basic
principles of Jewish law).
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Getty images on a website.2 To be sure, these rabbis might not necessarily
give a carte blanche dispensation for software piracy, since such copying
would be illegal under secular law—the law of the land is the law, after all,
and Jews are obligated to follow that law. Unlike so many other prohibi-
tions, however, the source of this law is external (the law of the land) rather
than internal (Jewish law).
Developing a concept of intellectual property has been problematic for
Jewish law.3 By contrast, regular property rights are very much recognized
and enforced in the Jewish tradition; even a person without any background
in Jewish law is aware of the biblical injunction “[t]hou shalt not steal.”
Over a hundred pages of the Talmud are dedicated to property issues, and
this topic has been debated and discussed for a millennium and a half since
the Talmud’s redaction.4 If taking another’s material property without per-
mission is theft, why should appropriating another’s creative work by repro-
ducing it without permission be any different? Stated succinctly: why is
intellectual property any less “property” than real or movable property?
The argument presented here is that the various theories of property in
Jewish law present an intellectual barrier to the creation of a concept of
intellectual property, the main one being that the intellect is connected with
the divine and the spiritual rather than the physical and the mundane. While
physical property can be rightly “owned,” thoughts and ideas, which are
inherently spiritual, can never be owned.
I. REGULAR PROPERTY IN JEWISH LAW
The concept of ownership of non-intellectual property presents a cer-
tain challenge for Jewish law and any legal system that posits a Creator to
whom the world belongs.5 If God created the world and the world is His,
how can we assign property rights to individuals? This question is dealt
with in a number of Jewish sources and in a variety of contexts, some of
them surprising to the Western legal mind.6
2. Horav Yisrael Belsky, Copyright in Halacha, HALACHA BERURAH 1, 8–11, http://www.
torahlive.co.il/templatebild/tipsresources/Halachahbrura.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
3. See David Nimmer & Neil W. Netanel, Is Copyright Property? The Debate in Jewish
Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 241 (2011) (summarizing various approaches in Jewish law to
intellectual property). See also Matthew I. Kozinets, Copyright and Jewish Law: The Dilemma of
Change, 1 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 83 (1995) (presenting the problem of IP rights in
Jewish law).
4. For a summary of the basic rules of property law in Jewish sources, see George J. Web-
ber, The Principles of the Jewish Law of Property, in 10 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 82 (1928). A
more in-depth treatment of Jewish property law can be found in 1 RABBI ISAAC HERZOG, THE
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW (1965).
5. For an attempt at a Jewish philosophy of property, see Yosef Yitzhak Lifshitz, Founda-
tions of a Jewish Economic Theory, AZUREONLINE, http://azure.org.il/include/print.php?id=212
(last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
6. As Menachem Elon noted, “Anyone who has participated in a Talmudic discussion will
realize that there is no difference between a discussion of civil law and a discussion of the law of
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A word of introduction about the sources of Jewish law is important
here. The Jewish legal tradition is based upon written law (the biblical ca-
non of the Old Testament) and the oral law (laws and sayings that were
eventually compiled in what is called the Talmud).7 In Tractate Berakhot,
the Talmud discusses the requirement of making a blessing before eating
food:
R[abbi] Levi asked: It is written, “The earth is the Lord’s and the
fulness thereof[.]” ([Psalms 24:1]). [However, another verse
states:] “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth
hath He given to the children of men.” ([Psalms 115:16])! There
is no contradiction [between the two verses]; the former passage
referring to before the benediction [has been uttered], the latter to
after the benediction.8
Rabbi Levi resolves the apparent contradiction in the Psalmist’s own
words by creating a religious obligation to recite a blessing before eating
anything. This statement of Rabbi Levi does not relate directly to property
rights, but it sheds light on a religious philosophy of property: although all
of creation ultimately belongs to God, the physical world is given to
humans once there has been an acknowledgement that God is the source.
The Talmud takes this idea to its logical conclusion and states that eating
without reciting a blessing is a form of theft, “One who derives benefit from
this world without a blessing is [similar to] one who steals from the Holy
One Blessed be He.”9
Jewish law prohibits the use of stolen goods in ritual acts and invali-
dates a ceremony which used stolen property.10 In Hebrew, this is called a
mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveira meaning, a good deed11 that came through a
sin.12 One who steals a matza, the unleavened bread eaten at the Passover
seder, and eats it at the appropriate time, has not fulfilled the Biblical obli-
gation of eating matza on Passover.13 The prohibition on using stolen goods
for religious purposes is broad and touches upon nearly every facet of Jew-
ish ritual.14 As a consequence of this prohibition, Jewish law requires ritual
sacrificial offerings or ritual impurity, as regards the use of legal concepts and terminology or in
the way the laws are discussed.” The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
221, 222 (1985).
7. ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 3–4 (Chaya Galai trans., Basic Books 2006).
The sections of the Talmud discussed in this article are from the Babylonian Talmud, unless
otherwise specified.
8. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE BERAKHOT 35a (Rev. A. Cohen ed., 1921).
9. Id.
10. Palestinian Talmud Tractate Hallah 1:9.
11. The term mitzvah has been translated as good deed, although a more literal translation
would be commandment. For more on the mitzvot, see THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 6–19
(Menachem Elon ed., 2007).
12. Palestinian Talmud Tractate Hallah, supra note 10.
13. Palestinian Talmud Tractate Shabbat 13:3.
14. Tosafot, Tractate Sukka 30a.
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objects to be acquired—either by purchase or gift—before being used in a
religious context.15 On the face of it, this requirement is puzzling: if God’s
will is to perform certain rituals, why should the issue of ownership matter?
The question becomes more perplexing when we consider that all physical
objects come from God. Why would He be offended when we serve him
with property that is ultimately His?
The Talmud offers a parable to answer these questions.16 When the
king passed by a toll collector, he insisted on being no different than a
commoner and paid the toll.17 The king’s assistants asked him why he paid
since the toll collector would send the money to the royal treasury.18 The
king responded that travelers should learn from his example and not avoid
the toll collectors.19 Similarly, the Talmud states, God forbade the use of
stolen property in religious services to teach people to stay far away from
theft.20
The prohibition on using stolen goods emphasizes the importance Jew-
ish law places on establishing property rights. That the Talmud chose to
reinforce property rights in this context speaks volumes about the respect
accorded to property rights, which, in the end, trump religious obligations.
The sages of the Talmud took respecting property rights to the next level,
giving them a form of sanctity. The Babylonian Talmud cites a statement of
Rabbi Yohanan: “[h]e who steals even a penny from his fellow, it is as if he
took away his soul.”21
The Talmudic statement attributed to Rabbi Yohanan is quoted by
Maimonides in the first chapter of the laws of Theft and Lost Property in
his Mishne Torah.22 The fact that Maimonides would cite as binding law
what appears to be mere Talmudic exaggeration speaks to the special status
accorded to property in Jewish law. In his Sefer Hamitzvot, a work listing
all of the commandments of the Torah,23 Maimonides explains that the bib-
lical injunction of “you shall not profit by the blood of your neighbor”24
requires one to act to protect another person’s property from damage or
theft. This is the case even though the plain meaning of the verse seems to
refer to bodily harm by saying, “your friend’s blood.”25 Maimonides’ inter-
15. THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 11, at 200–01.
16. Talmud Tractate Sukkah 30a.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Talmud Tractate Bava Qamma 119a.
22. For some background about Maimonides’ Mishne Torah, see HERBERT DAVIDSON,
MOSES MAIMONIDES: THE MAN AND HIS WORKS 189–230 (2005).
23. Id. at 168.
24. Leviticus 19:16 (NRSV).
25. SEFER HAMITZVOS Prohibition 297 (Rabbi Berel Bell trans., 2006), available at http://
www.chabadoceandrive.com/library/article_cdo/aid/961927/jewish/Negative-Commandment-297.
htm.
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pretation might stretch the plain meaning of the verse, but it dovetails with
Rabbi Yohanan’s comparison of physical property to human life.
The Talmudic sources mentioned previously relate to Jewish law; the
Jewish homiletic literature (aggadah) found in the Talmud26 also accords
great respect to property rights.
The third chapter of Exodus, presenting the episode of the burning
bush, prefaces Moses’ divine revelation with a curious statement: “Moses
was keeping the flock of his father-in-law Jethro, the priest of Midian; he
led his flock beyond the wilderness . . . .”27 Moses’ occupation at the time
of God’s revelation would seem to be irrelevant, so the Midrash Tanhuma28
justifies the extraneous factual background by extrapolating a lesson in eth-
ics from Moses’ shepherding his father-in-law’s flock. The passage states:
The Holy One, blessed be He, does not confer greatness upon a
man until He tests him in lesser things. Only then does He elevate
him to greatness.
. . .
[W]hen Moses tended the flock of Jethro . . . he led it to the
farthest end of the wilderness in order to keep the sheep from
stealing. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: You have
been found trustworthy with regard to sheep; now I shall entrust
My flock to you that you may shepherd it. . . .”29
The Midrashic homily gives an entirely different context to the story of
the burning bush. Moses was chosen to lead the children of Israel, not due
to his great spiritual heights, but because of his care for mundane property
rights, as demonstrated by the fact that he prevented his flock from grazing
on ownerless land.
Rabbinical literature does not merely glorify biblical figures who re-
spect the property rights of others but also those who took care of their own
property. The Talmud expands upon the biblical story of Jacob’s wrestling
with the angel in Genesis 32.30 The Bible introduces the scene with the
vague remark “Jacob was left alone.”31 The Bible does not explain why
Jacob was left alone leaving much to the imagination. The Talmud, in typi-
cal midrashic, or homiletical, fashion embellishes the biblical story and
gives us the back-story. Jacob, who was traveling with his household to
26. For more on the allegorical parts of the Talmud, see H. L. STRACK & G ¨UNTER
STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH 15–16 (Markus Bockmuehl trans.
and ed., Fortress Press 1996).
27. Exodus 3:1 (NRSV).
28. Midrash Tanhuma is a collection of homiletical interpretations on the Pentateuch. For an
introduction to this branch of Rabbinic literature—the midrashim—see STRACK & STEMBERGER,
supra note 26, at 233–43.
29. MIDRASH TANHUMA-YELAMMEDENU: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF GENESIS AND EXO-
DUS 323–24 (Samuel A. Berman ed., Ktav Publ’g House 1996).
30. Talmud Tractate Hullin 91a.
31. Genesis 32:24 (NRSV).
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meet with his twin brother—and nemesis—Esau, had forgotten a few small
jugs. Concerned about the small jugs, Jacob left the safety of his encamp-
ment to find the jugs and, en route, he wrestled with an angel of God.32 The
Talmud deduces from Jacob’s act of retrieving the jugs—despite the risk of
leaving the safety of his camp—that the righteous care about their property
even more than their own life.33 What might look like an act of recklessness
is praised by the Talmudic sages as evidence of great piety.
II. ROOTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE TALMUD
The Talmudic statements mentioned are but a few examples of how
tangible property is protected—and even sanctified—which is far from the
case with intellectual property. Indeed, there are few references to what we
might call intellectual property in pre-sixth century Talmudic sources. This
is to be expected as a Talmudic reference to copyright, one and a half mil-
lennia before the Statute of Anne,34 would be a historical anachronism. It
was the rise of print, and later the industrial revolution, that necessitated a
legal framework for dealing with intellectual property.35 The pre-modern
socio-economic context of Talmud was not the legal petri dish for the de-
velopment of intellectual property theory.
However, there are sources in the Talmud that entertain the concept of
authorship of ideas and possibly even the notion that ideas can be consid-
ered property. One can see the traces of a theory of authorship in a Tal-
mudic homily, based upon a story in the Book of Esther.36 The Book of
Esther relates how the Jewish people were saved from Haman’s plan to
destroy them by the heroic efforts of Mordecai and his niece, Queen Esther,
who was married to King Ahasereus.37 The second chapter of the Book of
Esther ends with the uncovering of a plot to assassinate King Ahasereus.38
Mordecai informed Queen Esther of the plot and Esther passed the informa-
tion to the king—in Mordecai’s name—thus saving the king’s life.39
Although the fact that Mordecai saved the king’s life was quickly for-
gotten, the matter resurfaces in the sixth chapter of Esther when the king
reads the royal chronicles and discovers Mordecai’s long-forgotten heroic
act.40 Since Mordecai never received any credit for his heroism, the king
32. Talmud Tractate Hullin, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Copyright Act, 1709, 8 Anne., c. 19 (Eng.) (repealed 1842). This was the first copyright
act passed in England. See William Paltry, The Role, or Not, of Ethics and Morality in Copyright
Law, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 445, 456 (2011).
35. ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 120–21
(1979).
36. Talmud Tractate Megilah 15a, available at http://halakhah.com/pdf/moed/Megilah.pdf.
37. Esther 2 (NRSV).
38. Id. at 2:21.
39. Id. at 2:22.
40. Id. at 6:2.
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decided to reward Mordecai for his deed by making Haman parade him
around town in royal clothing.41 This proved vital to the downfall of Haman
and thwarting his plan to destroy the Jewish people.42
The Talmud derives a lesson in ethics from Mordecai’s story in Esther:
“R[abbi] Elazar further said in the name of R[abbi] Hanina: ‘[w]hoever
reports a saying in the name of it’s originator, brings deliverance to the
world,’ as it says [Esther 2:22]: ‘. . . [a]nd Esther told the king in the name
of Mordecai.’”43 Since the Jewish people were saved because Esther men-
tioned her source, the Talmudic sages stress in the Talmud that anyone who
attributes an idea to its source will also bring salvation. This is a case of
homiletic scriptural interpretation and not binding law, yet if we go beyond
the superficial hyperbole we can distill the beginnings of a theory of author-
ship, if not intellectual property.
As Rabbi Isaac Herzog observes, a glimpse of a Rabbinic theory of
intellectual property can be found in an unusual Talmudic passage.44 The
passage discusses a number of inventions that various individuals made to
facilitate Temple worship and praises them for their creative contributions.
An example of this type of invention is a special pumping system for ritual
washing. The Talmud contrasts these people, who used their skills for a
holy purpose, with others who keep their inventions or skills secret, ostensi-
bly for financial gain:
And these were mentioned to their shame: They of the house of
Garmu would not teach anything about the preparation of the
showbread. They of the house of Abtinas would not teach any-
thing about the preparation of the incense. Hygros, son [of the
tribe] of Levi knew a cadence in song, but would not teach it; Ben
Kanzar would not teach anyone his art of writing. Concerning the
former it is said: The memory of the righteous shall be for a bless-
ing; concerning the others it is said: But the name of the wicked
shall rot.45
The Talmud relates how the sages tried to bypass the various cartels by
bringing in experts from Egypt who could create knockoffs of their prod-
ucts.46 Unfortunately, this was not successful. No one was able to copy the
special incense of the Abtinas family or able to make the showbread in
quite the same way as the Garmu family. When the sages begged the cartels
41. Id. at 6:10.
42. Id. at 6:13.
43. Tractate Megilah, supra note 36. Some see this homily as an early source for copyright.
See Victor Hazan, The Origins of Copyright Law in Ancient Jewish Law, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 23, 25 (1970).
44. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 71.
45. Talmud Tractate Yoma 38a.
46. Id.
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to return, they agreed on the condition that their salaries, paid from the
Temple treasury, be doubled.47
In general, the sages’ skills relate to Temple worship or other ritual
matters, which complicates matters somewhat. The Rabbis’ criticism of
these familial guilds may stem from a desire to save public funds and not a
larger comment on whether ideas should be protected as property. It should
be noted, however, that these families who sought to protect their intellec-
tual property are castigated in extremely harsh terms—even calling them
wicked—where a milder comment would have sufficed. Furthermore, there
is no record of similar criticism directed at those who supply the Temple
with goods. For these reasons, the discussion of the Temple cartels should
be viewed as a sign that the sages of the Talmud were aware—and criti-
cal—of the sequestration of intellectual property for personal use and profit.
III. THE PRINTING PRESS AND THE USE OF APPROBATIONS
The issue of intellectual property rights was largely dormant until
Gutenberg.48 With the advent of printing, the question of how to deal with
intangible property became a tangible issue for the Jewish law. The general
approach—used from the sixteenth century until quite recently—was for an
author to seek written approbations for his work. These are known as has-
kamot.49 The haskamot were much more than a blurb from a New York
Times review printed on the back cover of a paperback; the approbations
included prohibitions against reprinting the book for a limited period of
time.50 The punishment for violating the ban was excommunication.51
Perhaps the most famous legal case in Jewish history regarding appro-
bations was the Vilna-Slavuta controversy.52 In 1822, a printing house in
the city of Slavuta (in modern-day Western Ukraine) published an edition
of the Talmud during a rabbi-led ban prohibiting the printing of the Talmud
for fifteen years. The first edition sold out, and, in 1835, the printer, Moshe
Shapiro, wanted to make a second printing run. Word got out that the
Romm family, from the city of Vilna, Lithuania, intended to publish their
own edition of the Talmud, and had already secured approbations banning
anyone else from publishing a Talmud for a period of twenty years! Nearly
every major scholar of Jewish law was drawn into the controversy. The
issue was resolved when the most recognized authority on Jewish law,
47. Id.
48. ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO
GATES, 8–1 (2009).
49. Kozinets, supra note 3, at 93–95. For a discussion of the intimate link between the print-
ing press and Jewish copyright law, see Neil W. Netanel, Maharam of Padua v. Giustiniani: The
Sixteenth-Century Origins of the Jewish Law of Copyright, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 821, 821–70 (2007).
50. Kozinets, supra note 3, at 93–94.
51. Id. at 91.
52. Arthur Silverstein, Copyright in Jewish Law, 14:3 TRADITION 28, 29 (1974). The facts
presented here follow Belsky, supra note 2, at 5–6.
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Rabbi Akiva Eiger, ruled in favor of the Vilna edition arguing that the origi-
nal ban of fifteen years was limited to the first printing of the Slavuta press.
Therefore, since the first edition had been sold out (actually, there were
forty copies unsold and the Romm family was ordered to purchase them),
the copyright had expired.
As a side note, the Vilna-Slavuta polemic ended in tragedy when one
of the employees of Shapiro committed suicide. The Czarist authorities
blamed Shapiro’s sons who were thrown in jail without due process. One
can only speculate that the bitter end to the Vilna-Slavuta dispute left its
mark on Jewish history and might possibly have discouraged litigation of
copyright disputes.
Whatever bad taste the Vilna-Slavuta affair left with European Jewry,
approbations and bans continued to be issued.53 Nevertheless, the wide-
spread use of approbations never led to the development of a theory of
intellectual property. The lone exception is the opinion of Rabbi Joseph
Saul Nathanson, a nineteenth century scholar of Jewish law and Chief
Rabbi of the Austro-Hungarian city of Lemberg (modern-day Lviv,
Ukraine).54 Rabbi Nathanson was a prolific author, composing thousands of
responsa that were ultimately printed in his massive fifteen–volume work,
Shoel Umeshiv.55
Rabbi Nathanson comes the closest to offering a legal Jewish theory
that recognizes intellectual property rights. In Shoel Umeshiv he says:
Certainly an author who prints a new book has a right to it . . . and
in any case, whenever anyone prints or invents a new device, no
one else may do so without his permission. It is well known that
Rabbi Abraham Jacob or Hrubashov invented a calculating ma-
chine and received royalties from the Czar his whole life. There-
fore, our entire Torah should not become like an idle conversation
of theirs.56
Rabbi Nathanson’s argument is not—as a superficial reading might
suggest—that Jewish law recognizes copyright as a right per se, but given
that such a right exists under non-Jewish legal systems, Jewish law must
recognize this right as well. This also means if the non-Jewish legal systems
were to decide to deny the protection of intellectual property rights, then
Jewish law would follow suit.
To appreciate the novelty of Rabbi Nathanson’s methodology, a few
words about Jewish jurisprudence are in order. Rabbinical decisors anchor
their opinions in precedent found within the Jewish tradition. Drawing upon
53. Israel Schneider, Jewish Law and Copyright, 21 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 1, 8
(1991).
54. Nimmer & Netanel, supra note 3, at 223.
55. Shillem Warhaftig, Joseph Saul Nathanson, ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, available at http:/
/www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0015_0_14591.html.
56. RESPONSA SHOEL UMESHIV 1 no. 44.
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an earlier source, such as scripture, the Talmud, or later Rabbinical litera-
ture, connects the rabbi deciding the case to the chain and tradition of Jew-
ish law.57 This approach should be familiar to the American legal
community from the writings of United States Supreme Court Justice
Scalia, who has openly criticized using foreign law as a basis for constitu-
tional interpretation.58 Regardless, Rabbi Nathanson’s opinion is excep-
tional, as is his methodology of deriving a binding legal principle from
outside the Jewish legal tradition.59
Jewish law recognizes the principle of dina demalkhuta dina, meaning,
“the law of the kingdom is the law,” which holds that the ruler enjoys bind-
ing legal authority over his constituents.60 Indeed, some believe this to be a
possible source prohibiting infringement of intellectual property,61 as Jew-
ish law demands that one follow local law, which has legislated protection
of intellectual property. This theory, based upon dina demalkhuta dina,
merely creates an illusion of intellectual property law, for the existence of
an in personam obligation to follow the law of the land does not create an in
rem right to intellectual property.62
In contrast to the dina demalkhuta dina theory, Rabbi Nathanson’s ap-
proach might actually have succeeded in creating a real live intellectual
property right. The question proposed at the beginning of this article can be
asked concerning Rabbi Nathanson as well: Why did he look to a foreign
legal system to create that right, instead of searching for some kind of pre-
cedent in Jewish history, even a tenuous one? The “mystery” of intellectual
property theory in Jewish law is not why it did not exist in the past, but why
it does not exist in the present.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE INTELLECT IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND
MYSTICAL/KABBALISTIC STREAMS OF JUDAISM
The mystery of intellectual property in Jewish law can be demystified
by looking to the two main streams of Jewish thought: the philosophical/
57. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Cultural Analysis Paradigm: Women and Synagogue Rit-
ual as a Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 609, 612–13 (2012).
58. Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. at 14 (June 26, 2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
Justice Scalia’s words, “The Court’s discussion of these foreign views . . . is therefore meaning-
less dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads,
or fashions on Americans . . . .’”
59. I know of no other source in the responsa literature where a legal principle is borrowed
explicitly, from a non-Jewish source.
60. 2 GIL GRAFF, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: DINA DE-MALKHUTA DINA IN JEWISH
LAW, 8–29 (Leon J. Weinberger ed., 1985).
61. Nimmer & Netanel, supra note 3, at 222.
62. Rabenu Jonah of Gerondi, in his gloss to Talmud Tractate Bava Bathra 44b, indicates the
principle of dina demalkhuta dina can only create an obligation on an individual person (that is, an
in personam right), yet it does not give the government the power to determine property
ownership.
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rational and mystical/Kabbalistic schools.63 Nearly without exception, the
scholars of Jewish law were more than experts on Jewish law; they were
steeped in one of these two traditions, and sometimes both. Thus, Maimoni-
des—perhaps the most well-known Jewish philosopher—authored both
philosophical works, such as his Guide to the Perplexed, and legal works,
such as the Mishne Torah.64
Rabbi Joseph Karo, a sixteenth-century legal scholar who was part of
the circle of mystics in Safed, a city in northern Israel, authored the Shulhan
Arukh, the code of Jewish law that is binding among all Orthodox Jews.65
Since the jurists of Jewish law were either philosophers or mystics, the
Jewish legal tradition is intimately connected to the various philosophical
and mystical streams of Judaism. If we can understand the underlying
worldviews of the creators of Jewish law, we will discover the philosophi-
cal roadblock to a world of intellectual property rights.
A. The Philosophical School of Thought: The Intellect is Everything
Maimonides states that “He, may His name be praised, and His knowl-
edge are one,”66 which indicates that knowledge and the divine are synony-
mous. It is not surprising then, that the Jewish philosophers, drawing upon
schools of Aristotelian thought, saw God as the supreme intellect from
which emanates lower levels of intellect.67
The central goal of man’s existence, according to this stream, is to
unify with the creator, or, at the least, to come close to him through the
intellect.68 In his introduction to the Mishna, which is the basis of the Tal-
mud, Maimonides states this explicitly:
[Man’s] purpose is but a single activity. The other skills [man
possesses] serve only the purpose of assuring his survival, to in-
sure the [fulfillment] of that one activity. This [cardinal] activity
is the following: to grasp in his mind the secrets of the fundamen-
tal truths, and to understand the verities [in life] as they are.69
63. OLIVER LEAMAN, JEWISH THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTION 81 (2006).
64. DAVIDSON, supra note 22.
65. Shira Schoenberg, Luria, Isaac Ben Solomon, ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Luria.html. Rabbi Karo’s involvement with
mysticism was more than theoretical: he wrote an entire book describing the mystical revelations
he had communicated to him from a maggid, or angelic teacher. See R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY,
JOSEPH KARO: LAWYER AND MYSTIC 22–24 (2d ed. 1962).
66. MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Repentance [Teshuvah] ch. 5:5 (Moznaim Publ’ns 1990),
available at http://www.chabadoceandrive.com/library/article_cdo/aid/911903/jewish/Chapter-
Five.htm.
67. Don Seeman, Honoring the Divine as Virtue and Practice in Maimonides, 16(2) J. JEW-
ISH THOUGHT & PHIL. 195, 223–24 (2008).
68. Gideon Freudenthal, The Philosophical Mysticism of Maimonides and Maimon, in MAI-
MONIDES AND HIS HERITAGE 113, 123–24 (Idit Dobbs-Weinstein et al. eds., 2009).
69. Rav Eli Hedad, Lecture #1: The Life of Maimonides in Light of His Writings, THE ISRAEL
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The previous quotations are from Maimonides’ legal corpus; his philo-
sophical works, especially the Guide to the Perplexed, devote hundreds of
pages to the place of the intellect in divine worship. Maimonides interprets
the entire biblical and rabbinic canon through the prism of the intellect.70
Prophecy, divine providence, and observance of God’s commandments are
the mitzvot: all of these are given interpretations related to the intellect.71
Maimonides goes so far as to take two mystical expressions mentioned
in the Talmud—the Work of Creation (Genesis) and the Work of the Char-
iot (Ezekiel’s vision), which were historically interpreted as mystical con-
cepts through much of Jewish history72—and translates them into the
Aristotelian concepts of physics and metaphysics, respectively.73 When one
studies the physical and metaphysical sciences, one comes closer to God.
Divine revelation is achieved, therefore, by using one’s mind and enquiring
into the world, whether through contemplating the natural world, the meta-
physical word, or even through studying the Torah.74 It should be empha-
sized that physicality and especially the body are impediments to achieving
this goal: namely, to approach a transcendent God.75
B. The Kabbalistic Tradition: Connecting to the Intellect Through
Mitzvot
For the sake of historical accuracy, the Kabbalistic tradition was not
the only mystical tradition in Judaism. But, being the dominant mystical
tradition, the Kabbalah served as the primary theological framework for the
rabbis who developed and advanced Jewish law in the modern period.76
The Kabbalistic system understood the world as emanating from the
Ein Sof, or Infinite, through four worlds: emanation (the highest), creation,
formation, and action (the lowest).77 Each world has ten sefirot, or divine
attributes.78  The divine influence flows through all four worlds until it
reaches the final destination before our physical worlds is the attribute of
(translated by David Strauss) (translating and quoting MOSES MAIMONIDES, INTRODUCTION TO THE
MISHNAH 56 (1992).
70. Arthur Hyman, Maimonides as Biblical Exegete, in MAIMONIDES AND HIS HERITAGE 1,
9–11 (Idit Dobbs-Weinstein et al. eds., 2009).
71. Id. at 2.
72. GERSHOM SCHOLEM, ORIGINS OF THE KABBALAH 19 (R. J. Zwi Werblowsky ed., Allan
Arkush trans., 1987) (genesis is referred to as “bereshith”).
73. Warren Zev Harvey, Aggadah in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, 24 DINE YISRAEL 197,
197 (2007).
74. Freudenthal, supra note 68. See also KENNETH SEESKIN, SEARCH FOR A DISTANT GOD
61–65 (2000) (framing contemplation as a religious ideal).
75. SEESKIN, supra note 74, at 106–07, 151.
76. David B. Ruderman, Kabbalah and the Subversion of Traditional Jewish Society in Early
Modern Europe, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 169, 170 (1993).
77. GERSHOM SCHOLEM, KABBALAH 119 (1974).
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kingship in the world of action.79 The Kabbalah understands God’s connec-
tion to the world through these ten attributes, which can be grouped into
three classes: left (strict judgment and punishment), right (mercy), and mid-
dle (the combination of the two).80 The focus in the mystical tradition is not
so much on God’s intellect as on the divine influence and its interaction
with the physical and spiritual worlds.81
Kabbalistic scholars took their their theosophy and practice in a num-
ber of directions. The dominant approach—the Lurianic school—held that
one should study the mystical meanings behind performing the command-
ments.82 While performing the commandments, one should concentrate on
how the particular mitzvah resulted in a spiritual change in the heavenly
worlds.83
Where does this leave the physical world? As mentioned above, the
philosophical school saw a form of divine worship in contemplating phys-
ics. Rabbi Isaac Luria, founder of Lurianic Kabbalah, proposed that the
physical world was full of sparks of holiness, which are trapped in the
“shells” of evil.84 The purpose of mankind is to serve God by releasing
these sparks from their “entrapment” in the physical world.85 The uplifting
of divine sparks is accomplished by using physicality in the proper way and
with the proper mystical intent—in accordance with Jewish law.86
The Kabbalistic scholars, no doubt influenced by the philosophical tra-
dition, equated the sparks with the intellect, so that, in a sense, all of physi-
cality is infused with the divine intellect. Rabbi Nahman of Bratzlav, a
Hassidic teacher in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Ukraine,87
summarizes this stream of thought,88
For the Jew must always focus on the inner intelligence of every
matter, and bind himself to the wisdom and inner intelligence that
is to be found in each thing. This, so that the intelligence which is
in each thing may enlighten him, that he may draw closer to God
through that thing. For the inner intelligence is a great light that
shines for a person in all his ways. As it is written (Ecclesiastes
8:1), “A person’s wisdom causes his countenance to shine.”
79. Id.
80. SCHOLEM, supra note 77, at 106–08 (stating that each group of sefirot are comprised of
opposing attributes).
81. Id. at 382–84.
82. Id. at 176.
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84. LAWRENCE FINE, PHYSICIAN OF THE SOUL, HEALER OF THE COSMOS: ISAAC LURIA AND
HIS KABBALISTIC FELLOWSHIP 135 (2003).
85. SCHOLEM, supra note 77, at 161–65.
86. Id.
87. For a comprehensive biography of Rabbi Nahman, see ARTHUR GREEN, TORMENTED
MASTER: THE LIFE AND SPIRITUAL QUEST OF RABBI NAHMAN OF BRATSLAV (1979).
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The effect of the theory of divine sparks, as formulated by Rabbi
Nahman, is to spiritualize the intellect and to equate the holiness of the
physical world with its intellectual component. Thus, service of God is dis-
covering the intellect that is trapped in the physical world.
C. The Spirituality of Thought
Thought and the intellect have been equated with the spiritual in both
the philosophical and Kabbalistic traditions. The claim here is that spiritual
nature of thought and intellect prevented Jewish scholars from going in the
direction of intellectual property rights and protection. The rabbis had no
problem protecting rights over physical property through principles of
tort.89 Since physical possessions belong to humans (“the earth He has
given to the children of men”),90  it would only be natural that those rights
be respected. However, when we turn to the kind of property that is essen-
tially a thought, the idea of affording rights of ownership over thoughts was
inconceivable, since any kind of intellectual property is essentially an at-
tempt to claim ownership over that which is spiritual, and thus cannot be
owned.91
For example, Jewish law prohibits charging money for spiritual ser-
vices. A teacher of Jewish law is not allowed to accept payment for teach-
ing. Just as God himself did not ask for payment when he revealed the
Torah, so too humans may not charge money for spreading His teachings.92
Many sources even prohibit physicians from charging for their services,
which are considered a mitzvah and thus a form of religious work.93 The
view that secular wisdom is a form of divine wisdom is stated explicitly by
Rabbi Nahman of Bratzlav:
Concerning those inventions and devices invented by the philoso-
phers in their wisdom, such as amazing weaponry and other in-
struments created through wisdom and the like and other
novelties that they invented, each one with his wisdom – he said
that all of this is from above, for they would never have been able
to arrive at that [invention], without the spark of intellect in their
wisdom, that a sparkling came from above to that particular wise
man, for the time had come that the wisdom or invention should
be revealed in the world . . . For certainly the scholars of previous
generations also investigated these matters – why did they not
arrive at the same invention or discovery . . . But the rule is that
all kinds of innovations that wise men create – whether in holi-
89. For a short summary of the Jewish law of tort, see THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra
note 11, at 319–24.
90. Psalms 115:16.
91. Tellingly, the term in modern Hebrew for intellectual property is qinyan ruhani, or “spiri-
tual property.”
92. Talmud Tractate Bekhorot 29a.
93. FRED ROSNER, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND JEWISH LAW 31 (2001).
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ness, such as explanations [of the Torah] or homilies and the like,
and also, in other [secular] wisdoms – everything is passed to
them from their intellect above, each one from the appropriate
place.94
This passage is noteworthy since Rabbi Nahman connects the process
of innovating Jewish laws with the process of scientific invention, both of
which come from “above.”  In addition, Rabbi Nahman uses the exact same
terminology used by Lurianic Kabbalah for the divine sparks (nitsots) to
describe the creative impulse that leads to the discovery or invention. The
word choice is not accidental and the reference to the Kabbalistic concept of
sparks—which Rabbi Nahman connected elsewhere with the intellect—is
deliberate. The explicit linking of mundane thought (scientific discovery)
and holy thought (discoveries in Torah) demonstrates the thesis of this arti-
cle, namely, that in the Jewish tradition, thought of any kind is inherently
sacred.
CONCLUSION
The title of this article refers to a “mystery,” namely, a resistance
among the scholars of Jewish law to allow for any sort of recognition of
ownership over intellectual property. There are, no doubt, some practical
explanations for why Jewish law has avoided labeling intellectual property
as such.95 The argument presented here is that a fundamental principle of
Jewish law is that matters of the spirit are to remain free from ownership
and commerce. The religious ramifications of defining intellectual property
as property are enormous; according to both the philosophical and Kabbal-
istic streams, the intellect is synonymous with the divine. Once we allow
for thoughts to be owned, traded, and restricted, we blur the boundaries
between the sacred and profane. Moreover, intellectual property creates a
theologically dangerous notion that this holiness—the divine—is for sale.
The proposal here is not that Jewish law consciously avoided creating
an intellectual property theory because of theological concerns. Rather, the
intellectual currents of the major philosophical and mystical streams—
which located thought and knowledge in the sphere of holiness—shaped the
development of Jewish law, setting it down a path along which intellectual
property was inconceivable.
94. Sihot Haran 5.
95. For a socio-political explanation of this phenomenon, see Nimmer & Netanel, supra note
3, at 248.
